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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
WEST VALLEY CITY FRATERNAL 
ORDER OF POLICE LODGE #4, a 
non-profit Utah corporationf 
and JIM CROWLEY, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants , 
-vs-
DENNIS NORDFELT, West Valley 
Chief of Police, and WEST 
VALLEY CIVIL SERVICE 
COMMISSION, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
Appellants, West Valley City Fraternal Order of Police Lodge 
#4 and Jim Crowley, will reply herein to certain of the arguments 
raised by Appellees in their brief: 
ARGUMENT 
I. IN THEIR OPENING BRIEF APPELLANTS 
MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE THAT 
SUPPORTS THE FINDINGS OF FACT 
Plaintiffs, in sections II. A. and III. A. of their opening 
brief, satisfied this court's marshaling requirement by present-
ing the array of evidence presented to the trial court in con-
junction with defendants1 Motion to Dismiss. 
Plaintiffs specifically challenged findings nos. 2, 3, 4, 7, 
8, 10 and 11. Plaintiffs marshaled the evidence supporting those 
Appellate No. 920276-CA 
Priority Classification 16 
findings and then supported their argument that those findings 
were erroneous, in part by pointing out that the trial court 
disregarded the affidavits supplied by plaintiffs [R.229-232, 
330-369] despite their being specifically incorporated into 
Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum In Opposition to Defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss [R.345] and plaintiffs Reply Memorandum in 
Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Joinder [R.341]. 
For example, finding of fact number 2 was challenged by 
plaintiffs because it was the trial court's springboard to the 
conclusion that seniority was properly considered in the 
promotion examination process. Defendants, in arguing 
plaintiffs' failure to marshal the evidence in support of finding 
number 2, fail to recognize that the only relevance this finding 
has to the case is in regard to the question of whether seniority 
was adequately considered. As such, the additional evidence 
defendants claim was not included in plaintiffs' opening brief 
regarding the one year probationary period serves only to 
establish the logical requirement that officers complete their 
probation before being promoted and is merely cumulative to the 
evidence marshaled by plaintiffs. The length of the probationary 
period is not an issue in this case. Whether seniority was 
properly considered is an issue raised by plaintiffs, and 
plaintiffs have demonstrated that finding number 2 is flawed both 
because it is clearly contradicted and because it cannot support 
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the trial court's legal conclusion that seniority was adequately 
considered. See Appellants' Opening Brief at 22-23. 
In regard to findings of fact numbers 3 and 4, defendants 
conveniently ignore the fact that the thrust of plaintiffs' 
attack on those findings is that they fail to acknowledge that 
Chief Nordfelt and Guy Kimball recognized that P.O.I officers 
were not allowed to participate in the promotion examination 
process and then acted improperly to waive "the restriction in 
the Civil Service requirements stating that officers applying for 
the position of Sergeant be of a POII rank, be waived." [R.110]. 
Plaintiffs' challenges to findings numbers 3 and 4 are directed 
at what was omitted from those, and indeed allf of the trial 
court's findings and the fact that the findings only reflect the 
status of the facts after the illegal waiver obtained by Chief 
Nordfelt and Guy Kimball on June 6, 1989. [R.110]. Given the 
specific nature of plaintiffs' challenges to findings 3 and 4, 
plaintiffs have adequately marshaled the facts that tend to 
support them. See Appellants' Opening Brief at 23-24. 
Plaintiffs adequately marshaled the evidence supporting 
findings numbers 7 and 8. See Appellants' Opening Brief at pp. 
36-39. With respect to finding number 7, defendants point to 
supporting factual references that are not included in plain-
tiffs' original discussion of the evidence, but plaintiffs submit 
that should not be fatal to plaintiffs' challenge of or disposi-
tive of the verity of finding no. 7. In light of plaintiffs' 
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claims that he was improperly required to compete against ineli-
gible candidates and that his seniority was not considered, the 
fact Crowley failed the written examination by one point cannot 
properly be found to be the sole reason why Crowley "...did not 
proceed further in the promotional process." [R.432]. As to 
finding number 8f defendants fail to call the court's attention 
to any substantial evidence absent from plaintiffs1 marshaling 
effort other than that discussed with respect to finding 7. The 
"threshhold qualification" of a completed probation does not, as 
defendants argue, equate with proper consideration of seniority. 
Plaintiffs clearly demonstrated why finding nuraber 8 is fatally 
flawed. See Appellants1 Opening Brief at pp. 38-39. 
Plaintiffs also sufficiently marshaled the evidence that 
tends to support findings numbers 10 and 11. Defendants1 brief 
acknowledges that plaintiffs properly marshaled the evidence that 
tends to support finding number 11, and with respect to finding 
number 10, defendants suggest only that plaintiffs should have 
reinterated the evidence that tends to support the trial courts' 
findings with respect to the seniority and the improper waiver of 
the P.O.II requirement. 
Plaintiffs presented the evidence before the trial court 
that tends to support the trial court's findings of fact and 
thereby satisfied this court's marshaling requirement. 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF 
FACT ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS 
The only finding of fact made by the trial court that even 
remotely addresses the issue of the consideration of the candi-
dates1 seniority was finding of fact number 2 which states: 
One year of service with the West Valley City Police 
Department was required in order to be eligible for 
promotion for Sergeant. [R.432] 
The requirement that candidates "must be off probation" was a 
minimum qualification, as stated in the June 6, 1989 memorandum: 
Must have four years of police experience (plus 
two additional years police experience if 
substituting for college). 
Must have two years of college (two years police 
experience can be substituted)• 
Must be off probation. 
Must have above average performance evaluation. 
[R.006]. The length of the probationary period is not an issue 
in this case. Plaintiffs challenge finding number 2 because it 
is patently erroneous insofar as the trial court used it to 
support the legal conclusion that seniority was properly con-
sidered. 
Plaintiffs allege that the candidates1 seniority in service 
was not considered as required by Utah Code Ann., § 10-3-1010 
(1983), which states in pertinent part: 
The civil service commission shall provide for pro-
motion in the classified civil service on the basis of 
ascertained merit, seniority in service and standing 
obtained by competitive examination....(emphasis 
added.) 
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Rule 111-1/ W.V.C.C.S.P.P.M. (1988)r similarly states: 
The Commission shall provide for promotion in the Civil 
Service on the basis of ascertained merit/ seniority in 
service and standing obtained by competitive ex-
amination. ...(emphasis added.) 
While defendants go to great lengths to establish that the 
probationary period was one year# they present no evidence that 
minimum qualification was intended to be consideration of senior-
ity. Neither the June 6f 1989 nor the July 7, 1989 memoranda 
make any reference to consideration of seniority. There is no 
evidence to indicate that seniority was considered. 
The trial court/ however, presumably determined seniority 
was considered when it concluded F.O.P. and Crowley did not 
suffer injury related to the conduct of defendants and therefore 
had no standing. To the extent the trial court and defendants 
relied on finding number 2 to support the conclusion that senior-
ity was properly considered/ it is clearly erroneous. 
Findings of fact numbers 3 and 4 state: 
[3:] The requirements for promotion to sergeant 
required that applicants hold the rank of police 
officer within the West Valley City Police Department. 
[R.432] 
[4:] Within the rank of police officer, all grades 
(P.O.I/ P.O.II and P.O.Ill) were eligible for promotion 
to sergeant/ with no grade preference given to the 
members of any one grade [R.432]. 
The controversy regarding findings numbers 3 and 4 is 
caused/ in partf by the variable uses and meanings ascribed to 
the term "rank" by the parties. Even Chief Nordfelt and Guy 
Kimball/ however/ within the specific context of the promotional 
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evaluation at issue here, referred to P.O.II as a designation of 
"rank." [R.110 (June 6, 1989 memorandum at para. 1, line 5; 
para. 2, lines 2, 7)]. While defendants now differentiate 
between "rank" and "grade," it is clear that they did not do so 
when they committed the acts plaintiffs complain of. The remain-
der of the controversy regarding findings 3 and 4 stems from the 
trial courtfs apparent failure to consider plaintiffs1 allegation 
that Chief Nordfelt and Guy Kimball illegally waived the require-
ment that candidates be at least P.O.II officers in order to be 
eligible for promotion to sergeant. Although the illegal P.O.II 
waiver issue is one of the two principal improprieties plaintiffs 
alleged occurred in the design and administration of the pro-
motion evaluation, it is not directly addressed in the trial 
court's findings and conclusions. Like the issue of seniority, 
consideration of the illegal waiver of the P.O.II requirement is 
necessary to a fair determination of whether F.O.P. and Crowley 
had standing. For that reason plaintiffs have challenged the 
findings that most closely approach the facts that bear on the 
P.O.II issue, findings 3 and 4. 
The clearest evidence that candidates were initially 
required to be P.O.II officers comes from the June 6, 1989 
request for waiver Chief Nordfelt addressed to the Commission 
which states: 
The Police Department is considering offering a Ser-
geant's test to establish a promotional roster for that 
rank. As a result of this, we request that the 
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restriction in the Civil Service requirements stating 
that officers applying for the position of Sergeant be 
of P.O.II rank, be waived. 
...Therefore, since the reasons for these officers not 
reaching the rank of P.O. II qualifying them for the 
Sergeant test is due to the Department's inability to 
offer such a position to themf we respectfully request 
that the Civil Service Board waive this restriction for 
the testing. 
[R.110]. See also Chief Nordfeltfs August 16, 1990 deposition 
testimony quoted at R. 293-295 (Addendum at A-C) . On that same 
day, Guy Kimball approved the request by his signature on the 
letter [R 110, 117, 294-95]. The P.O.II requirement was thereby 
waived by a single Commissioner and without the benefits of the 
other Commissions1 deliberation or a hearing of any kind. 
Obviously, both Chief Nordfelt and Guy Kimball recognized that 
P.O.I officers were not eligible for promotion to sergeant. Guy 
Kimball, as Chairman of the Commission, is the best source of 
interpretation for the rules and requirements the Commission 
adopted pursuant to statute. See McPhie v. Industrial 
Commission, 567 P.2d 153, 155 (Utah 1977). The waiver effected 
by Chief Nordfelt and Guy Kimball was illegal. Rule 1-6, 
W.V.C.C.S.P.P.M. (1988); Hayward v. Pennock, 444 P.2d 59, 61, 21 
Utah2d 242 (1968). F.O.P. and Crowley suffered distinct and 
palpable injury when P.O.I officers illegally became eligible to 
compete in the evaluation process, and that injury is part of the 
basis for F.O.P. 's and Crowley's standing in this case. To the 
extent findings 3 and 4 fail to acknowledge the illegal waiver of 
the P.O.II requirement, they are clearly erroneous. 
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Plaintiffs submit that finding of fact number 7 is also 
clearly erroneous when it is examined in light of plaintiffs1 
claims that Crowley was required to compete against ineligible 
candidates and that his seniority was not considered. Finding 
number 7 states: 
Plaintiff Jim Crowley did not receive the minimum 
required passing score on the written examination and, 
therefore, did not proceed further in the promotional 
process [R.432]. 
Crowley's failure, by one point, to pass the written examination 
portion of the evaluation does not support the trial courts1 
conclusion that Crowley was not injured and therefore did not 
have standing. Hayward v. Pennock, 444 P.2d at 60. In addition, 
because ineligible candidates were allowed to compete and senior-
ity was not considered, plaintiffs submit Crowley's score on the 
written examination is irrelevant, and a new examination should 
be given. Hayward v. Pennock, 444 P.2d at 60. The primary flaw 
in finding number 7 is the statement that the written examination 
is the reason Crowley did not proceed further in the promotional 
process. That conclusion assumes the evaluation process was 
properly designed and administered and in so doing it ignores the 
very nature of Crowley's action. It is therefore clear errone-
ous. 
Finding number 8 states: 
Plaintiff Jim Crowley did not suffer a distinct, 
particularized and palpable injury related to the 
conduct of Defendants [R.432]. 
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Plaintiffs' discussion of findings of fact numbers 2, 3 and 4, 
supra, and Point IV, infra, establishes that the trial court did 
not consider the nature of Crowley's claims or the evidence 
supporting those claims when it determined that Crowley was not 
injured by defendants' actions. Crowley was injured by the 
failure to consider his seniority and by being found to compete 
with ineligible candidates. It was improper for the trial court 
to ignore those claims based solely on Crowley's test score. 
Hayward v. Pennock, 444 P.2d at 60. Crowley was injured when he 
was not afforded a fair opportunity for promotion, and to the 
extent finding 8 states he was not, it is clearly erroneous. 
Defendants misquote finding number 10. See Appellees' Brief 
at p. 26. It states: 
Members of the F.O.P. did not suffer distinct, 
particularized and palpable injury related to the 
conduct of Defendants. [R.433]. 
As with finding number 8, finding number 10 is clearly erroneous 
because it fails to address the seniority and eligibility issues 
raised by plaintiffs and discussed more fully in appellants' 
opening brief and in conjunction with findings of fact 2, 3 and 4, 
supra. There is no evidence in the record to indicate the 
candidates' seniority was considered in the evaluation process. 
Defendants made the disingenuous assertion that because candi-
dates were required to be off probation, their seniority was 
considered. 
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The one year of probationary service cannot substitute for 
proper consideration of each candidate's relative seniority in 
service. Defendants also cannot escape the fact that Chief 
Nordfelt and Guy Kimball illegally waived the requirement that 
candidates be at least P.O.II officers in order to be eligible 
for promotion to sergeant. The unimpeachable evidence that the 
P.O.II requirement exists in provided by the waiver itself. 
[R.110, 117, 293-95]. There would have been no need to waive 
that requirement if it did not exist. The trial court overlooked 
the injuries - the seniority and eligibility issues - when it 
adopted finding number 10. 
Plaintiffs submit that finding of fact number 11 is clearly 
erroneous, and because the Society of Professional Journalists v. 
Bullock, 743 P.2d 1166, 1172 (Utah 1987), appellate standing test 
does not apply, that it is irrelevant. It states: 
Plaintiff F.O.P. did not present its claims to the 
Civil Service Commission prior to the commencement of 
this lawsuit. [R. 433]. 
The fatal error of finding number 11 is amply discussed in 
appellants' opening brief and at point V, infra. The portions of 
Cory Ervin's affidavit [R.186] upon which defendants rely does 
not cancel the allegations and clear documentary evidence plain-
tiffs have presented [R. 10-12, 13, 110, 116, 332, 335, 338-39]. 
Plaintiffs have argued that the Commissions rules and 
regulations did not provide a means for Department officers to 
object to improprieties in the promotion examination process. In 
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their attempt to counter this argumentf defendants first miscon-
strue it. In their opening brief, plaintiffs argued, ". .. the 
Commissions1 rules and regulations did not provide a process..." 
See Appellants1 Opening Brief at 27. That statement is true. 
The West Valley City Civil Service Policy and Procedures Manual 
contains no rules addressing officers' rights to seek review of 
the promotion examination process. Without Commission rules to 
guide them, the F.O.P. officers, including Crowley, presented 
their claims to the Commission as best they could. Appellees 
brief recognizes that fact. "...The 30 officers who signed the 
August 23, 1989 letter did successfully bring alleged 
improprieties to the Commission and received a response from the 
Commission following the Commissions1 investigation.1 Appellees1 
Brief at p.29. 
It is clear the trial court did not adequately consider the 
claims raised by F.O.P. and Crowley when it determined that 
neither F.O.P. nor Crowley suffered injuries as a result of 
defendants1 conduct. For that reason, plaintiffs submit that 
this court should conduct a de novo review of the trial court's 
dismissal of plaintiffs' claims. See, Moir v. Greater Cleveland 
Regional Transit Auth., 895 F.2d 266, 269 (6th Cir. 1990); Love 
v, U.S., 871 F.2d 1488 (9th Cir. 1989). The trial courts' 
findings of fact numbers 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 10 and 11 are clearly 
erroneous and should be reversed. 
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III. EVEN ASSUMING CONFLICTS OF 
INTEREST DO EXIST, F.O.P. HAS 
STANDING TO BRING THIS ACTION 
IN IT'S REPRESENTATIVE CAPACITY. 
Even if it is assumed, arguendo/ that conflicts of interest 
exist between individual F.O.P. members, those conflicts do not 
preclude F.O.P.'s standing. This is particularly true in this 
case where, as previously argued by plaintiffs, the "diverse 
interests11, as they are characterized by defendants, stem primar-
ily from the unfair advantage conferred upon three F.O.P. members 
because of the improper and illegal design and administration of 
the promotion examination process. R.I. Chapter, Association of 
General Contractors v. Kreps, 450 F.Supp. 338 (D.Ct.R.I. 1978), 
discussed in appellants1 opening brief, makes it clear that an 
association need not adequately represent the interests of any 
association members who receive advantage or benefit by the 
illegal or improper acts complained of and that absence of injury 
to some members or discrepancies between the injuries suffered by 
an association's members are not fatal to the association's 
standing. The court stated: 
Although one contractor member was awarded a contract 
upon satisfaction of the 10 percent requirement, the 
possible absence of economic injury to him with regard 
to this one project, out of a possible twenty, does not 
destroy the Contractor Associations' standing to seek 
generalized relief.... 
Any conflict among competing Contractor Association 
members over the Pawtucket project does not affect the 
standing of this Association to assert the rights of 
injured members. The Association does not function 
like a class representative, Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(4), as 
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defendants suggest. It need not adequately represent 
the interest of the member who won the Pawtucket 
contract. That member can intervene to represent his 
own interests pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 24 without the 
showing of inadequate representation required under 
Rule 23(d). The suit by the Association has the same 
effect on this member's rights as would any facial 
attack brought by single contractor on his own behalf, 
(citation omitted). 
R.I. Chapter, 450 F.Supp. 338 at 347 n.3. 
Defendants' assertion that the courts have consistently 
ruled to the contrary is incorrect. In Gillis v. U.S. Dept. of 
Health and Human Services, 759 F.2d 565 (C.A. 6th 1985) , the 
court found that an association of nursing home residents, 
hospital patients, patients' relatives and health care profes-
sionals had standing to claim that the Department of Health and 
Human Services had failed to ensure that hospitals properly 
fulfilled their obligations under the Hill-Burton Act to provide 
services without charge or at reduced charges to eligible pa-
tients. Rejecting the argument that the association's members1 
interests were "...too diverse and the possibilities of conflict 
too obvious to make the association an appropriate vehicle to 
litigate the claims of its members," Gillis, 759 F.2d at 572 
(quoting Associated General Contractors v. Ottertail Power Co., 
611 P.2d 684, 691 (8th Cir. 1979)), the court stated: 
Although there is a theoretical conflict between 
...[the association's] members posited by HHS, it would 
not seem to be the type that should deprive an asso-
ciation of representational standing. See National 
Constructions Ass'n v. National Electrical Contractors 
Assn., 498 F.Supp. 510, 520-21 (D.Md. 1980). First the 
adverse effects to certain members of the relief being 
Page -14 
sought are both speculative and indirect. Second, once 
an organization has alleged actual injury to 'its 
members, or any one of them', Warth v. Sedlin, 422 U.S. 
at 511, 95 S.Ct. at 2211 (emphasis added), it may argue 
on behalf of the 'public interest'. Sierra Club v. 
Morton, 405 U.S. at 737-38, 92 S.Ct. at 1367-68. 
Virtually any relief involving the expenditure of money 
that benefits some but not all of an organization's 
members potentially means that money will be unavail-
able to or in part exacted from the remainder of the 
membership. By joining an organization dedicated to a 
particular goal in the public interest, members indi-
cate a willingness to make certain sacrifices produc-
tive of that goal. Carried to its logical extreme, 
evaluation of representational standing in terms of the 
adverseness of remote interests of discrete members 
would seriously undermine the ability of individuals 
through organizations to achieve public interest 
objectives through the system. CjE. NCAA v. Califano, 
622 F.2d 1382, 1391-92 (10th Cir. 1980) (where one or 
more members of association support bringing suit, 
association has standing absent showing that more 
members oppose than support associations position). 
Gillis, 759 F.2d at 572-73. Where, as here, the charge before 
the court is that classified civil service employees have lost 
the protections afforded by the merit system that governs their 
employment, the "public interest" is at issue. 
The reasons for the adoption of a merit system are to 
protect employees and the public from the evils of the 
spoils system and to assure to each officer an orderly 
opportunity for promotion. (emphasis added.) 
Hayward v. Pennock, 444 P.2d at 61. Furthermore, the individual 
participation of individual F.O.P. members is not required 
because appellants have not requested monetary damages. Utah 
Restaurant Association v. Davis County Board of Health, 709 P.2d 
1159, 1163 (Utah 1985) . 
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Appellees claim the most dramatic example of conflict is the 
fact that Chief Nordfelt was an F.O.P. member when the case was 
filed. Chief Nordfelt, however, resigned his membership in 
F.O.P. on October 3, 1991 [R.408-410 (Addendum at D-F) ] . The 
fact that Chief Nordfelt was once a member of F.O.P. does not 
create a conflict that should now prevent F.O.P. from having 
standing in this case. 
Any conflicts among F.O.P. members that may exist are not of 
the kind that prevent F.O.P. from meeting the cissociation stand-
ing test first enunciated in Utah Restaurant Associationf 709 
P.2d at 1163 and Society of Professional Journalists, 743 P.2d at 
1170. 
IV. CROWLEY HAS STANDING TO BRING THIS ACTION 
Defendants' primary argument in support of their contention 
that Crowly did not have standing is that Crowley suffered no 
injury and therefore has no personal stake in the outcome of the 
dispute. In making that argument, defendants ignore the nature 
of the factual support for the injuries Crowley has alleged. 
Crowley alleged that he was improperly required to compete 
against ineligible candidates holding only the P.O.I rank [R. 
113-118, 338] and that his approximately nine years of seniority 
was not considered in the promotion process as required by law 
[R. 6-9f 113-118, 338]. In addition, Crowley alleged the Commis-
sion was illegally constituted on October 4, 1989, when the 
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officers1 complaints were summarily dismissed by the Commission, 
and that candidates were not allowed equal access to study 
materials [R. 10-13, 117]. Contrary to defendants' claim, 
Crowley's injuries are not merely generalized interests or 
grievances shared by the public. Furthermore, defendants have 
falsely stated that the quote from Hayward v. Pennock, 444 P.2d 
59, 60, 21 Utah2d 242 (1968), provided in appellants' opening 
brief at p. 40, suggests Crowley's claims are "an interest shared 
by the 'employees and the public."1 Appellees' Brief at p. 38. 
The quote provided by plaintiffs does not contain that statement. 
In Hayward v. Pennock, the Utah Supreme Court recognized that 
every valid participant in a civil service promotional evaluation 
is personally injured if the evaluation is not conducted 
according to state law and commission rule and ruled this was no 
less true for applicants who did not pass the written portion of 
the evaluation. Hayward v. Pennock, 444 P.2d at 60. As 
discussed in Point II, supra, Crowley clearly suffered distinct 
and palpable injuries that gave him a personal stake in the 
outcome of this case. Crowley therefore has standing. The trial 
courts' ruling is incorrect and should be reversed. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPLYING 
THE APPELLATE STANDING TEST 
Defendants argue that the F.O.P.-Crowley Complaint "...is 
clearly in the nature of the now abolished writ of mandamus'1 
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[Appellees' Brief, p.40], presumably suggesting that the action 
was an attempt to obtain an extraordinary writ pursuant to Utah 
Rule of Civil Procedure 65B (1988) and Utah Supreme Court Rule 19 
(1987) . Based thereon, the trial court required plaintiffs to 
meet the appellate standing test stated in Society of Journal-
ists, 743 P.2d at 1172 [R.434 at para. 6; 435 at para. 9]. 
Defendants' reliance on Lee v. Provo City Civil Service Commis-
sion, 582 P.2d 485 (Utah 1978) and Child v. Salt Lake City Civil 
Service Commission, 575 P.2d 195 (Utah 1978) in support of its 
argument that "courts have traditionally treated appeals from 
decisions of civil service commissions as being governed by Rule 
65B" is misplaced. In both of those cases the officers peti-
tioned the district court for extraordinary writs after they were 
discharged from their employment and pursued their appeal rights 
with the respective civil service commissions. Lee and Child 
were treated as extraordinary writ cases because that is how they 
were initiated. They were not converted into extraordinary writ 
proceedings as defendants argue is appropriate here. The instant 
case differs factually and procedurally because plaintiffs 
attempted to get the Civil Service Commission to adequately 
address their concerns despite the fact that the Commission's 
rules did not specifically provide for review of the promotion 
examination process. [R.10-12, 116, 332, 335, 339]. When the 
Commission summarily dismissed the issues raised, F.O.P. and 
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Crowley then filed a direct action. The Society of Journalists 
appellate standing test simply does not apply in this case. 
Defendants in effect concede that the Commission considered 
the claims raised by F.O.P., but incorrectly assert that the 
Commission's ruling was not adverse to F.O.P. (Appellees' Brief 
at p. 41.) F.O.P. officers and Crowley initially brought their 
concerns to the attention of the Commission by letter dated 
August 23, 1989 [R. 10-12, 116, 332, 335, 339]. Those alle-
gations were summarily dismissed by the October 4, 1989 letter 
signed by Commissioners Guy Kimball and Don Meyers [R. 113, 116]. 
A copy of that letter was delivered to an F.O.P. representative 
[R. 116] . Even if it was appropriate to apply the appellate 
standing test to plaintiffs in this case, F.O.P. and Crowley have 
met that test. Both F.O.P. and Crowley had standing to bring 
their claims before the Commission. They brought those claims 
before the Commission and they received an adverse ruling. 
Defendants cannot escape the fact that the Commission produced an 
adverse response to the officers' claims [R. 13]. 
Plaintiffs did not initiate this action under the authority 
of Rule 65B. The trial court erred in applying the appellate 
standing test and in determining that plaintiffs had not sat-
isfied that test. 
VI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 
DENYING THE MOTION FOR JOINDER 
Defendants misperceive the nature of the relief sought by 
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plaintiffs in regard to the motion for joinder. On appeal 
plaintiffs have requested that the trial court's subject matter 
jurisdiction rulings be reversed. If rulings are reversed and 
plaintiffs are found to have had standing in the court below, it 
necessarily follows that the motion for joinder was not moot and 
should have been granted. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs respectfully submit 
that the trial court's rulings with respect to F.O.P.'s and 
Crowley's standing be reversed, that the dismissal based on lack 
of standing be reversed and that the case be remanded back to the 
District Court for trial with direction to allow proposed 
co-plaintiffs Shopay and Salmon to join the action. 
DATED this J day of December, 1992. 
CONDER & WANGSGARD: 
C Jerrkld £>T Cundei ^ 
N. Pe£er L. Rognlie 
—ff£torney for Plaintiffs/ 
Appellants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
certify that on December 
served two (2) copies of the attached Appellants1 Reply Brief upon 
J. Richard Catten, Assistant City Attorney, counsel for the 
appellees in this matter by mailing them to him by first-class 
mail with sufficient postage prepaid to the following address: 
Catten, Esq. 
attorney 
Blvd. 
', UT /64119 
iter L. Roorilie 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/ 
Appellants 
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ADDENDUM 
Table of Contents Page 
Chief Nordfelt*s Agust 16, 1990 deposition 
testimony [R. 293-255] A-C 
William Salmon Affidavit re: Conflict of Interest, 
including October 3, 1991 letter of Chief Nordfelt 
[R. 408-410] D-F 
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Defendants now argue in their memorandum that the Civil 
Service Commission did not waive a requirement to sit for the 
sergeant's examination. This disengenuous argument misleads the 
court and ignores the facts and documents on record which have 
been provided in discovery. 
On August 16, 1990, Chief Dennis Nordfelt was deposed. The 
questions and responses regarding the requested waiver of the 
POII requirement are as follows: 
Q. (BY MR. BENNETT) Chief, I hand you what has been marked 
as Exhibit 2 and ask you to examine that. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Can you tell us what that is? 
A. This is a memorandum that was sent under my signature, 
my name, to the Civil Service Commission requesting a waiver for 
the sergeant's test. 
Q. Did you prepare this letter, this memorandum? 
A. Probably not. I probably directed either one of my 
staff or my administrative assistant to give them the content and 
said, "Write me a memo to the Civil Service Commission." 
Q. You don't recall specifically who that would have been? 
A. No. 
Q. Can you tell us what problem it is addressing? 
A. Yes. The previous requirement to become a candidate for 
sergeant had been and were at the time that an officer to be 
POII, a police officer 2. However, because of budgetary prob-
lems, there had been several officers in the office that were 
qualified, otherwise qualified to be POII's and should have been, 
but we had not been given the money in our budget to allow it to 
occur. 
So other then penalize them over something which they had no 
control over, where they would otherwise be qualified had the 
money been in the budget, it was my opinion that they should be 
allowed to compete for the rank of sergeant. 
Q. Can you recall how this problem came to your attention 
about th POI, POII requirements? 
A. No. 
Q. In the usual coi^ rse of your duties, how would such a 
problem usually come to your attention? 
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A. Well, believe it or not sometimes I pick up on something 
like that. 
Q. Every once in a while? 
A. Every once in a while. Sometimes members of my staff, 
sometimes the personnel department, sometimes Mr, Catten. Quite 
often it comes from someone who is affected by this kind of a 
problem. 
Q. This particular instance you don't recall how it came to 
your attention? 
A. I do not. 
Q. But you directed the letter to be prepared or it was 
just somehow generated after you and your staff became aware of 
the problem? 
A. My recollection is that I was aware of the problem and I 
directed a memo to the Civil Service Commission. 
Q. It's dated June 6th of 1989? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Can you tell us what the mechanics were in getting this 
thing to the Civil Service Commission, this letter? 
A. As far as my mechanics were, it was to be put in my out 
tray after I had reviewed it. 
Q. Now, this exhibit doesn't bear your signature, does it? 
A. No. 
Q. That's not unusual for a memorandum though, is it? 
A. No, it is not. 
Q. When something goes in your out tray and in particular 
this document, what do you expect to have happen to it? 
A. I expect that it would be delivered to the Civil Service 
Commission. My guess is this was given to Cory, who is in the 
personnel department, who is the secretary to the Civil Service 
Commission. That is generally what happens with communications 
to the Civil Service Commission unless we mail them, which I 
don't think we have ever done. I think it would always go to 
Cory and she would probably distribute them to the Civil Service 
Commission. 
Q. Now, the copy that we have has some handwriting down at 
the bottom? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Can you read what that says? 
A. No. 
Q. It seems to contain a date, doesn't it? 
A. Yes, it does. 
Q. What is that date? 
A. It looks to me like it's the 6th of June, 1989. 
Q. Did you see this memorandum returned to you after it had 
this writing put on it? 
A. I don't recall. 
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Q. Are you familiar with the — and I can't read it either 
and I am not familiar with the signatures. 
A. As I look at it, I don't know whose it is. 
Q. Who do you think it is? 
A. I believe it's Guy Kimball. 
Q. The first word on the first line, does that not appear 
to be the word approved? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So as best we can make out it says "approved 6-6-89, Guy 
Kimball"? 
Nordfelt Deposition, pp. 30-34. It is clear from Chief 
Nordfelt's own sworn testimony that there was a requirement that 
any officer sitting for the sergeant's exam be a POII officer 
with one year's experience. Chief Nordfelt acknowledged that 
requirement and, in fact, requested to have it waived. 
Guy Kimball, Chairman of the West Valley City Civil Service 
Commission, was deposed on August 16, 1990. In that deposition 
(at pp. 5-6, attached here'to as Exhibit "A") Mr. Kimball indicat-
ed that he read and signjed the memorandum (attached hereto as 
Exhibit "B") discussed in Chief Nordfelt's deposition. In 
addition, the Civil Service document provided by counsel in 
discovery (attached hereto as Exhibit "C") identifies the Civil 
Service requirements to sit for the sergeant's examination. 
There is no genuine issue that the Department and the Civil 
Service Commission required those sitting for the sergeant's exam 
to be of the rank of POII. The argument made by defendants is 
patently false and it not asserted in good faith. Because this 
argument violates Rule 11, U.R.Civ.P., plaintiffs request that 
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Jerrald D. Conder (#0709) 
K. C. Bennett (#3700) 
Of CONDER & WANGSGARD 
4059 South 4000 West 
West Valley City, UT 84120 
Telephone: (801) 967-5500 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and William Salmon and David Shopay 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WEST VALLEY CITY FRATERNAL 
ORDER OF POLICE LODGE #4, a 
non-profit Utah corporation, ' 
and JIM CROWLEY, 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs-
DENNIS NORDFELT, West Valley 
Chief of Police, and WEST 
VALLEY CIVIL SERVICE 
COMMISSION, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT RE: CONFLICT 
\ OF INTEREST 
Civil No. 89-0907667 CV 
i Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE : 
STATE OF UTAH : 
William Salmon, under oath, deposes and states: 
1. All statements made herein are based on my own personal 
knowledge and information. 
2. I am the recording secretary of West Valley Fraternal 
Order of Police Lodge #4. 
O0408 K 
TKi* .-. \ 
BY. /v 
3. On October 3, 1991, I received the resignation of Chief 
Dennis J. Nordfelt as a member of our organization. (a copy of 
that resignation is attached). 
4. Chief Dennis Nordfelt!s name has been stricken from the 
membership roles of West Valley Fraternal Order of Police Lodge 
#4 effective October 3, 1991. 
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT. 
DATED this ^ ~ day of October, 1991. 
1991. 
Willi am/S almon 
/ 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 3$ day of October, 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
I hereby certify that on the 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
30 day of October, 1991, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT RE: CONFLICT OF 
INTEREST was mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, to the 
following counsel of record: 
J. Richard Catten 
Assistant City Attorney 
3600 South 2700 West 
West Valley City, Utah 84119 
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C7A 
Sy7S/7 West Valley City 
^ 2 
POLICE'DEPARTMENT 
M E M O R A N D U M 
TO: 
FROM: 
DATE: 
SUBJECT: 
Officer Jim Crowley. F.O.P. President 
Ohior Dennis J. Nor-if* it 
F.O.P. MEMBERSHIP 
After due consi^eiat ion. 
7 can better Srrvve the. members 
member -:f * >,.- Fi'r.t rvna 1 •>••>.• 
resigning my mTiribersiilp in the 
any addition*.J action' is-
please ud\'-se me. 
It is my desire 
harmor-v. sr.d I • O.-K forward to 
-t... •« .. 
hove come to. the eor.clusivri "thst"'-
f th~ Dep6i*tin.-r;t bv not beina c: 
o: f-.«: ice. T'here:..» e . T .;.m 
. e r t e o t i ve ..: me cs i s t e iv . 11 
conoumma^e this >*e::ian3t ion
 f 
. 0. 
: n C J I i l i i P J i v t O WOl 
c c : Karen Lef tvn ch . C i t v Man-err 
. 3600 Constitution Blvd. West Valley City, Utah 84119-3720 Phone: (801) 966-3600 FAX: (80i) 966-9280. 
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